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Romain Beauxis and Catuscia Palamidessi
INRIA Saclay and LIX, ´Ecole Polytechnique
Abstract. The concept of anonymity comes into play in a wide range of sit-
uations, varying from voting and anonymous donations to postings on bulletin
boards and sending emails. The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use ran-
dom mechanisms which can be described probabilistically, while the agents’ be-
havior may be totally unpredictable, irregular, and hence expressible only nonde-
terministically. Formal definitions of the concept of anonymity have been inves-
tigated in the past either in a totally nondeterministic framework, or in a purely
probabilistic one. In this paper, we investigate a notion of anonymity which com-
bines both probability and nondeterminism, and which is suitable for describing
the most general situation in which the protocol and the users can have both
probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior. We also investigate the properties of
the definition for the particular cases of purely nondeterministic users and purely
probabilistic users. We formulate the notions of anonymity in terms of proba-
bilistic automata, and we describe protocols and users as processes in the prob-
abilistic pi-calculus, whose semantics is again based on probabilistic automata.
Throughout the paper, we illustrate our ideas by using the example of the dining
cryptographers.
1 Introduction
The concept of anonymity comes into play in those cases in which we want to keep
secret the identity of the agents participating in a certain event. There is a wide range
of situations in which this property may be needed or desirable; for instance: voting,
anonymous donations, and posting on bulletin boards.
Anonymity is often formulated in a more general way as an information-hiding
property, namely the property that a part of information relative to a certain event is
maintained secret. One should be careful, though, not to confuse anonymity with other
properties that fit the same description, notably confidentiality (aka secrecy). Let us
emphasize the difference between the two concepts with respect to sending messages:
confidentiality refers to situations in which the content of the message is to be kept
secret; in the case of anonymity, on the contrary, it is the identity of the originator, or
of the recipient, that has to be kept secret. Analogously, in voting, anonymity means
that the identity of the voter associated with each vote must be hidden, and not the vote
itself or the candidate voted for. A discussion about the difference between anonymity
and other information-hiding properties can be found in [16].
An important characteristic of anonymity is that it is usually relative to the capa-
bilities of the observer. In general the activity of a protocol can be observed by diverse
kinds of observers, differing in the information they have access to. The anonymity
property depends critically on what we consider as observables. For example, in the
situation of an anonymous bulletin board, a posting by one member of the group is kept
anonymous to the other members; however, it may be possible that the administrator
of the board has access to some privileged information that may allow him to infer the
member who posted it.
In general anonymity may be required for a subset of the agents only. In order to
completely define anonymity for a protocol it is therefore necessary to specify which
set(s) of members has to be kept anonymous. A further generalization is the concept
of group anonymity: the members are divided into a number of sets, and it is revealed
which one, among the groups, is responsible for an event, but the information as to
which particular member has performed the event remains hidden. In this paper, how-
ever, we only consider the case of a single group of anonymous users.
Various formal definitions and frameworks for analyzing anonymity have been de-
veloped in literature. They can be classified into approaches based on process-calculi
and transition systems [33, 30], epistemic logic [37, 16], and “function views” [19]. In
this paper, we focus on an approach based on a (probabilistic) process-calculus and on
probabilistic automata.
The framework and techniques of process calculi have been used extensively in the
area of security, to formally define security properties, and to verify cryptographic pro-
tocols. See, for instance, [2, 21, 29, 32, 3]. The common denominator is that the various
parties involved in the protocol are specified as concurrent processes and present typi-
cally a nondeterministic behavior. In [33, 30], the nondeterminism plays a crucial role in
the definition of the concept of anonymity, a definition which is based on the so-called
“principle of confusion”: a system is anonymous if the set of the possible observable
outcomes is saturated with respect to the intended anonymous users. More precisely, if
in one computation the culprit (the user who performs the action) is i and the observ-
able outcome is o, then for every other agent j there must be a computation where j is
the culprit and the observable is still o.
The principle of anonymity described above is elegant and general, however it is
limited in that it does not cope with quantitative information. Now, many protocols
for anonymity use random mechanisms, see, for example, Crowds [28], Onion Routing
[38], and Freenet [12]. The probability distribution of these may be known or become
known through statistical experiments. From this knowledge, and the observables, one
may be able to differentiate the agents quantitatively, namely to deduce that one agent
is more likely (has higher probability) to be the culprit than the others. This means
that we do not have perfect anonymity. However the definition of the non-deterministic
approach (in which of course the random mechanisms are approximated by nondeter-
ministic mechanisms) may still be satisfied, as long as it is possible for each of the other
agents to be the culprit, even with very low probability. In other words, the approach in
[33, 30], is based on the membership relation, and it is therefore only able to detect the
difference between possible and impossible, not the quantitative differences.
Another advantage in taking into account probabilistic information is that it allows
to classify various notions of anonymity according to their strength. See for instance
the hierarchy proposed by Reiter and Rubin [28]. In this paper we explore a notion of
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anonymity which corresponds to the strongest one in [28], namely beyond suspicion1:
from the observables all agents appear equally likely to be the culprit.
A probabilistic notion of anonymity was developed (as a part of a general epistemo-
logical approach) in [16]. The approach there is purely probabilistic, in the sense that
both the protocol and the users are assumed to act probabilistically. In particular the
emphasis is on the probability of the users to be the culprit.
In this work, we take the opposite point of view, namely we assume that we may
know nothing about the users. They may be totally unpredictable, and change attitude
every time, so that the choice of being the culprit cannot be quantified probabilistically,
not even by repeating statistical observations. Namely, it is a typical nondeterministic
choice2. We regard this as a special case, though: In general, we assume that the be-
havior of the users may be in part probabilistic and in part nondeterministic. As for
the protocol, it may use mechanisms like coin tossing, or random selection of a nearby
node, which are supposed to exhibit a certain regularity and obey a probabilistic dis-
tribution. On the other hand, also the protocol can behave nondeterministically in part,
due, for instance, to the (unpredictable) interleaving of the parallel components.
In summary, we investigate a notion of anonymity which combines both probability
and nondeterminism, and which is suitable for describing the general situation in which
both the users and the protocol can exhibit a combination of probabilistic and nondeter-
ministic behavior. We also investigate the properties of the definition for the particular
cases of purely nondeterministic users and purely probabilistic users.
One of the results of our investigation is that the property of anonymity does not
depend on the probabilities of the users (cfr. Section 6.1). We consider this indepen-
dence to be a fundamental property of a good notion of anonymity. In fact, a protocol
for anonymity should be able to guarantee this property for every group of users, no
matter what is their probability distribution for being the culprit.
In order to define the notion of probability we need, of course, a model of com-
putation able to express both probabilistic and nondeterministic choices. This kind of
systems is by now well established in literature, see for instance the probabilistic au-
tomata of [34], and has been provided with solid mathematical foundations and sophis-
ticated tools for verification. For expressing the protocols, we will use the probabilistic
asynchronous π-calculus introduced in [17, 27], whose semantics is based on a model
similar to [34].
Some of the results of this paper have appeared (without proofs) in [5].
1 To be more precise we should say that we think that it corresponds to the intended notion of
beyond suspicion in [28]. We cannot prove this correspondence because the definition there is
given only informally.
2 Some people consider nondeterministic choice as a probabilistic choice with unknown prob-
abilities. Our opinion is that the two concepts are different: the notion of probability implies
that we can gain knowledge of the distribution by repeating the experiment under the same
conditions and by observing the frequency of the outcomes. In other words, from the past we
can predict the future. This prediction element is absent from the notion of nondeterminism.
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1.1 Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall the nondeterministic approach
of [33, 30] to the notion of anonymity. In Section 3 we recall the dining cryptographers’
Problem by Chaum [11], which will serve as a running example throughout the paper,
and we motivate the necessity of copying with probabilities. In Section 4 we briefly
recall some basic notions about probabilistic automata and the probability of events (a
more formal and detailed presentation can be found in Appendix A.2). In Section 5 we
illustrate the notions and assumptions which are at the basis of our notion of anonymity.
In Section 6 we propose our notion of anonymity and we show some of its properties,
notably the independence from the probability of the users. In Section 7 we consider the
special case of purely nondeterministic users. In Section 8 we consider, on the contrary,
purely probabilistic systems, and we prove that, under certain conditions, our definition
corresponds to what in literature is known as conditional anonymity. In Section 11 we
discuss other related work. Finally, in Section 12 we conclude.
2 The nondeterministic approach to anonymity
In this section we briefly recall the approach in [33, 30]. In these works, the actions of
a system S are classified into three sets (see Fig. 1):
– A: the actions whose performer is intended to remain anonymous for the observer,
– B: the actions that are intended to be completely visible to the observer,
– C: the actions that are intended to be hidden from the observer.
C
A
BS
Fig. 1. Classification of the actions in an anonymous system (cfr. [30]).
Typically the set A consists of actions of the form a(i), where a is a fixed “abstract”
action (the same for all the elements ofA), and i represents the identity of an anonymous
user. Hence:
A = {a(i) | i ∈ I},
where I is the set of all the identities of the anonymous users.
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Consider a dummy action d (different from all actions in S) and let f be the function
on the actions of A
⋃
B defined by f(α) = d if α ∈ A, and f(α) = α otherwise. Then
S is said to be (strongly) anonymous on the actions in A if
f−1(f(S\C)) ∼T S\C,
where, following the CSP notation [18], S\C is the system resulting from hiding C in
S, f(S′) is the system obtained from S′ by applying the relabeling f to each (visible)
action, f−1 is the relation inverse of f , and ∼T represents trace equivalence3.
Intuitively, the above definition means that for any action sequence ~α ∈ A∗, if an
observable trace t containing ~α (not necessarily as a consecutive sequence) is a possible
outcome of S\C, then, any trace t′ obtained from t by replacing ~α with an arbitrary
~α ′ ∈ A∗ must also be a possible outcome of S\C.
We now illustrate the above definition on the example of the dining cryptographers.
3 The dining cryptographers’ problem
This problem, described by Chaum in [11], involves a situation in which three cryptog-
raphers are dining together. At the end of the dinner, each of them is secretly informed
by the master whether he should pay the bill or not. So, either the master will pay, or
he will ask one of the cryptographers to pay. The cryptographers, or some external ob-
server, would like to find out whether the payer is one of them or the master. However,
if the payer is one of them, they also wish to maintain anonymity over the identity of
the payer. Of course, we assume that the master himself will not reveal this information,
and also we want the solution to be distributed, i.e. communication can be achieved only
via message passing, and there is no central memory or central ‘coordinator’ which can
be used to find out this information.
A possible solution to this problem, described in [11], is the following: Each cryp-
tographer tosses a coin, which is visible to himself and to the neighbor to his left. Each
cryptographer then observes the two coins that he can see, and announces agree or dis-
agree. If a cryptographer is not paying, he will announce agree if the two sides are the
same and disagree if they are not. However, if he is paying then he will say the opposite.
It can be proved that if the number of disagrees is even, then the master is paying; other-
wise, one of the cryptographers is paying. Furthermore, if one of the cryptographers is
paying, then neither an external observer nor the other two cryptographers can identify,
from their individual information, who exactly is paying.
The dining cryptographers’ problem will be a running example throughout the pa-
per.
3.1 Nondeterministic dining cryptographers
In the approach of [33, 30] the dining cryptographers are formalized as a purely non-
deterministic system: the coins are approximated by nondeterministic coins, and the
choice on who pays the bill is also nondeterministic.
3 The definition given here corresponds to that in [33]. In [30] the authors use a different (but
equivalent) definition: they require ρ(S\C) ∼T S\C for every permutation ρ in A.
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1m 2m
0m
0out
2out1
out
Master
Crypt0
Crypt2Crypt1 Coin2
Coin1 Coin0
Fig. 2. Chaum’s protocol for the dining cryptographers [11, 30].
The specification of the solution can be given in a process calculus style as illus-
trated below. In the original works [33, 30] the authors used CSP [18]. For the sake of
uniformity here we use the π-calculus [25]. We recall that + (∑) is the nondetermin-
istic sum and | (Π) is the parallel composition. 0 is the empty process. τ is the silent
(or internal) action. cm and c(x) are, respectively, send and receive actions on channel
c, where m is the message being transmitted and x is the formal parameter. ν is an
operator that, in the π-calculus, has multiple purposes: it provides abstraction (hiding),
enforces synchronization, and generates new names. For more details on the π-calculus
and its semantics, we refer to Appendix A.1.
In the code below, ⊕ and ⊖ represent the sum and the subtraction modulo 3. Mes-
sages p and n sent by the master are the requests to pay or to not pay, respectively. pay i
is the action of paying for cryptographer i.
We remark that we do not need all the expressive power of the π-calculus for this
program. In particular, we do not need guarded choice (all the choices are internal be-
cause they start with τ ), and we do not need neither name-passing nor scope extrusion,
thus ν is used just like the restriction operator of CCS [24].
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Master =
∑2
i=0 τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0
+ τ.m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Crypt i = mi(x) . ci,i(y) . ci,i⊕1(z) .
if x = p
then pay i . if y = z
then out idisagree
else out iagree
else if y = z
then out iagree
else out idisagree
Coin i = τ .Head i + τ .Tail i
Head i = ci,ihead . ci⊖1,ihead . 0
Tail i = ci,itail . ci⊖1,itail . 0
Collect = out0(y0) . out1(y1) . out2(y2) . outall〈y0, y1, y2〉
DCP = (ν~c)(ν ~m)(ν ~out)(Master |
∏
i Crypt i |
∏
h Coinh | Collect)
Let us consider the point of view of an external observer. The actions that are to be
hidden (the set C) are the communications of the decision of the master and the results
of the coins (~m, ~c). These are already hidden in the definition of the system DCP . The
anonymous users are of course the cryptographers, and the anonymous actions (the set
A) is constituted by the pay i actions, for i = 0, 1, 2. The observable actions (the set B)
is constituted by those of the form outall〈x0, x1, x2〉 with xi ∈ {agree, disagree}, for
i = 0, 1, 2.
Let f be the function f(pay i) = pay and f(α) = α for all the other actions. It
is possible to check that f−1(f(DCP ))) ∼T DCP , where we recall that ∼T stands
for trace equivalence. Hence the nondeterministic notion of anonymity, as defined in
Section 2, is satisfied.
3.2 Limitations of the nondeterministic approach
As a consequence of approximating the coins by nondeterministic coins, we cannot
differentiate between a fair coin and a biased one. However, it is evident that the fairness
of the coins is essential to ensure the anonymity property in the system, as illustrated
by the following example.
Example 1. Assume that, whenever a cryptographer pays, an external observer obtains
almost always one of the three outcomes represented in Fig. 3, where a stands for agree
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Fig. 3. Illustration of Example 1: the results that are observed with high frequency.
and d for disagree. More precisely, assume that these three outcomes appear with a fre-
quency of 33% each, while the missing configuration, d, a, a, appears with a frequency
of only 1%. What can the observer deduce? We note that Crypt1 andCrypt2 exhibit the
same behavior while Crypt0 behaves differently. Hence, by symmetry considerations
(Coin0, Coin1 and Coin2 are opposite to Crypt1, Crypt2 and Crypt0 respectively)
he can deduce that Coin0 and Coin1 must be biased in the same way, and Coin2 must
be biased differently. More precisely, Coin0 and Coin1 must produce almost always
head, and Coin2 must produce almost always tail (or vice-versa). From this estimation,
it is immediate to conclude that, in the first case, the payer is almost for sure Crypt1, in
the second case Crypt2, and in the third case Crypt0.
In the situation illustrated in the above example, clearly, the system does not pro-
vide anonymity. However the nondeterministic definition of anonymity is still satisfied
(and it is satisfied in general, as long as “almost always” is not “always”, i.e. the fourth
configuration d, a, a also appears, from time to time). The problem is that the nonde-
terministic definition can only express whether or not it is possible to have a particular
outcome, but cannot express whether one outcome is more likely than the other.
3.3 Probabilistic dining cryptographers
The probabilistic version of the protocol can be obtained from the nondeterministic
one by attaching probabilities to the coins. We wish to remark that this is the essential
change with respect to [33, 30]: we faithfully model the random mechanisms of the
protocol as probabilistic, rather than approximate them as nondeterministic.
Concerning the choices of the users (represented in this example as the choice of
the master), those are in a sense independent from the protocol, and can be either non-
deterministic, or probabilistic, or both.
We use the probabilistic π-calculus (πp) introduced in [17, 27]. The essential differ-
ence with respect to the π-calculus is the presence of a probabilistic choice operator of
the form ∑
i
piαi.Pi
where the pi’s represents probabilities, i.e. they satisfy pi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i pi = 1, and
the αi’s are non-output prefixes, i.e. either input or silent prefixes. (Actually, for the
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purpose of this paper, only silent prefixes are used.) The detailed presentation of this
calculus is in Appendix A.2.
With respect to the program presented in Section 3.1, the definition of the Coin i’s
must be modified as follows (ph and pt represent the probabilities of the outcomes of
the coin tossing):
Coin i = phτ .Head i + ptτ .Tail i
It is clear that the system obtained in this way combines probabilistic and nonde-
terministic behavior, not only because the master may be nondeterministic, but also
because the various components of the system and their internal interactions can follow
different scheduling policies, selected nondeterministically (although it can easily be
seen that this latter form of nondeterminism is not relevant for this particular protocol).
4 Probabilistic automata
The models of computation combining probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior are
by now well established in literature, see for instance the probabilistic automata of [34],
and have been provided with solid mathematical foundations and tools for verification.
By unfolding a probabilistic automaton we obtain a computation tree, whose nodes,
in general, offer both probabilistic and nondeterministic choices. In the probabilistic
choices, the arcs are weighted with probabilities. The canonical way of defining the
probabilistic notions relevant for our work is the following: First we solve the nondeter-
minism, i.e. we choose a function ς (called scheduler) which, for each nondeterministic
choice in the computation tree, selects one of the possible alternatives. After pruning
the tree from all the non-selected alternatives, we obtain a fully probabilistic tree. In
such a tree, determined by ς , an execution (or run) is a maximal path, and an event is a
(measurable) set of executions. In the finite case, we define the probability of an execu-
tion as the product of all the weights in its arcs, and the probability of an event e, pς(e),
as the sum of the probabilities of the executions in e. For the infinite case, and for more
details about the above notions, we refer to Appendix A.2.
It should be clear, from the description above, that in general the probability of an
event depends on the chosen scheduler. For example, in Fig. 4 the tree P represents a
computation tree. From its root there is a nondeterministic choice between two transi-
tion groups (aka steps), which represent probabilistic choices. We adopt the convention
of identifying a step by drawing a curve across its transitions. Analogously, there is a
nondeterministic choice between two steps in the fourth node at the level immediately
below the root. The trees Q, R and S represent the result of pruning P under different
schedulers. Let us denote these schedulers by ς , ϑ and ϕ respectively. The probability of
the event b, under each of these schedulers, is: pς(b) = 1/3+1/9 = 4/9, pϑ(b) = 1/2,
and pϕ(b) = 0.
5 Our framework for probabilistic anonymity
In this section we illustrate the notions and assumptions which constitute the basis for
our definition of probabilistic anonymity.
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Fig. 4. A computation tree P and the fully probabilistic trees which derive from it under different
schedulers. The irrelevant labels are omitted, and the probability is omitted when it is 1.
The system in which the anonymous users live and operate is modeled as a proba-
bilistic automaton M [34], see Appendix A.2. Like in Section 2, we classify the actions
of M into the three sets A,B and C, which are determined by the anonymous users,
the specific kind of action on which we want anonymity, and the capabilities of the
observer:
– The set of the anonymous actions:
A = {a(i) | i ∈ I}
where I is the set of the identities of the anonymous users and a is an injective
functions from I to the set of actions which we call abstract action.
– The set of the visible actions, B. We will use b, b′, . . . to denote the elements of this
set.
– The set of the hidden actions C.
In the following we assume that the actions in C are already restricted in the system, so
we do not need to mention them explicitly.
It should be remarked that the term “visible” here is relative: we assume that the
observer can see only B and a, but, to the purpose of defining anonymity and checking
whether a system is anonymous, we need to leave the actions a(i)’s visible (i.e. not
restricted) as well.
Differently from [33, 30], we do not assume that the observables are necessarily the
traces of visible actions. A trace, indeed, contains not only the information on which
actions have been executed, but also in what order they have been executed. Now, the
observer may or may not be able to detect the order, and this is important because
the order may give information on the culprit. Another reason for considering such
abstraction is to make the analysis simpler. If we know, for instance, that the order of
the visible actions does not give any information about the culprit (for instance because
we know that the interleaving choices do not depend on the choice of the culprit) then
we can forget about it.
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In general, we abstract from the (visible) traces by assuming a partition O on
them. The observables of the system are then the elements of this partition, denoted
by o, o′, . . .. Note that each of them is a set of traces.
Another difference from [33, 30] is that we consider the possibility that only certain
schedulers are allowed. Thus, our notion of anonymity depends on the set of allowed
schedulers, regarded as a parameter. One reason for this choice is to make more effi-
cient the verification of the anonymity property. If we know, for instance, that the in-
terleavings do not give any information about the culprit then we can fix one particular
interleaving, thus reducing the number of schedulers to be taken into account.
Definition 1. An anonymity system is a tuple (M, I, a,O,Z , p), where M is a proba-
bilistic automaton, I is the set of anonymous users, a is the abstract anonymous action,
O is a set of observables, Z is a set of schedulers for M , and for every ς ∈ Z , pς is
a probability measure on the event space generated by the execution tree of M under
ς (denoted by etree(M, ς)), i.e. the σ–field generated by the cones in etree(M, ς) (cfr.
Appendix A.2).
Note that, as expressed by the above definition, given a scheduler ς , an event is a
set of executions in etree(M, ς). We introduce the following notation to represent the
events of interest:
– a(i) : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing the action a(i)
– a : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an action a(i) for an arbitrary i
– o : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an element of o.
We use the symbols ∪, ∩ and ¬ to represent the union, the intersection, and the com-
plement of events, respectively. By definition of a, we have
a =
⋃
i∈I
a(i)
Furthermore, by definition of O, all the observables are pairwise disjoint:
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o1, o2 ∈ O. o1 6= o2 ⇒ pς(o1 ∪ o2) = pς(o1) + pς(o2) (1)
and they cover all possible traces:
∀ς ∈ Z . pς(
⋃
o∈O
o) = 1 (2)
In this paper we assume there is at most one culprit per run. In other words, we
assume that all the a(i)’s are pairwise disjoint. This assumption is fundamental for the
notion of anonymity we propose, and for the results we obtain.
Assumption 1 (At most one culprit)
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i, j ∈ I. i 6= j ⇒ pς(a(i) ∪ a(j)) = pς(a(i)) + pς(a(j))
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6 Probabilistic anonymity for users with probabilistic and
nondeterministic behavior
In this section we develop a notion of anonymity for the general case in which also the
users, besides the protocol, combine probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior.
Example 2. An example of such kind of behavior in the dining cryptographers is the
following: assume the master may have a different attitude depending on the group of
cryptographers that meet for dinner. Say that there are two groups, and which of them
will meet for dinner is decided nondeterministically. The master will select the payer
with probabilities p0, . . . , p3 in the case of the first group, and q0, . . . , q3 in the case of
the second. Note that this situation may be quite common in practice: a certain protocol
may be used by different groups of users, which may act probabilistically, but whose
probability distribution may vary from one group to the other.
Such a master can be represented in πp as follows:
Master = τ.Master1 + τ.Master 2
Master1 =
∑2
i=0 pi τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0
+ p3τ.m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Master2 =
∑2
i=0 qi τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0
+ q3τ.m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Note that the choice in Master is nondeterministic while the choices in Master 1
and Master2 are probabilistic.
The notion of anonymity must take into account the probabilities of the a(i)’s. When
we observe a certain event o, the probability of o having been induced by a(i) must be
the same as the probability of o having been induced by a(j) for any other j ∈ I . To
formalize this notion, we need the concept of conditional probability. Recall that, given
two events x and y with p(y) > 0, the conditional probability of x given y, denoted by
p(x | y), is equal to the probability of x and y, divided by the probability of y:
p(x | y) =
p(x ∩ y)
p(y)
We are now ready to propose our notion of anonymity:
Definition 2 (Probabilistic anonymity for users with probabilistic and nondeter-
ministic behavior). A system (M, I, a,O,Z , p) is anonymous if
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O.
(pς(a(i)) > 0 ∧ pϑ(a(j)) > 0)⇒ pς(o | a(i)) = pϑ(o | a(j))
12
DCP
Master
1
Master2
o0
o1 o2 o3
o3
p3
o3
o0
p0
o0 o1
o1
o1
o1
p2
o2o2
o2
o2o2
o0
o0
o0
o1
o5
o4 o3o3
o3
p1
q0
q1
q2
q3
o4
o6o5
o7
o6
o71/4
1/4 1/41/4 1/4
1/4
1/4
1/41/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/41/4 1/41/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/41/4
1/4
1/41/4
1/4
1/4
Fig. 5. Illustration of Example 3.
Example 3. Consider the system in Example 2. Assume that the coins are totally fair.
For simplicity, let us fix the order of execution of the various components (interleav-
ing)4, so that the only nondeterministic choice is the choice of the master. Hence we
have Z = {ς, ϑ} where ς and ϑ selects Master 1 and Master 2 respectively. Assume
now that Master1 and Master 2 select as the payers i ∈ I with probability pi and
j ∈ I with probability qj , respectively. The possible observable events, in both cases,
are o0 = 〈a, a, d〉, o1 = 〈a, d, a〉, o2 = 〈d, a, a〉, and o3 = 〈d, d, d〉. These are the
results in case one of the cryptographers is the payer. The case in which none of them is
the payer gives the 4 configurations with an even number of d, which we will indicate
by o4, . . . , o7. Consider now the possible outcomes of the coins. These are 8: 〈h, h, h〉,
〈h, h, t〉, . . . 〈t, t, t〉. It is easy to see that, independently from which cryptographer is the
payer, each of the above observables is produced by exactly two configurations. If the
coins are fair, then, independently from the probability of the selected cryptographer,
each observable o corresponds to a cone in the tree (rooted in the node immediately af-
ter the selection of the cryptographer) which has probabilistic measure 1/4 (cfr Fig. 5).
Therefore pς(o | a(i)) = 1/4 = pϑ(o | a(j)). Hence Definition 2 is satisfied.
The behavior of a master which combines nondeterministic and probabilistic behav-
ior can be much more complicated than the one illustrated above. However it is easy to
see, by following the reasoning in the example above, that as long as the master does
not influence the behavior of the coins, and these are fair, the conditional probability of
each observable for a given payer is 1/4.
4 It is easy to see that, for this example, it does not matter which interleaving we consider.
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Proposition 1. Consider the dining cryptographers with arbitrary master (possibly
combining nondeterminism and probability). If the coins are fair under every sched-
uler, then the system is probabilistically anonymous.
The proof of the above proposition is a straightforward generalization of the Exam-
ple 3.
Example 4. Consider again the system in Example 2, but assume now that the coins are
biased. Say, Coin0 and Coin1 give head with probability 9/10 and tail with probability
1/10, and vice-versa Coin2 gives head with probability 1/10 and tail with probability
9/10. (This situation is analogous to that illustrated in Example 1.) Let us consider the
observable o0 = 〈a, a, d〉. In case Crypt1 is the payer, then the probability to get o0 is
equal to the probability that the result of the coins is 〈h, h, t〉, plus the probability that
the result of the coins is 〈t, t, h〉, which is r = 9/10∗9/10∗9/10+1/10∗1/10∗1/10 =
730/1000. In case Crypt2 is the payer, then the probability to get 〈a, a, d〉 is equal to the
probability that the result of the coins is 〈h, h, h〉, plus the probability that the result of
the coins is 〈t, t, t〉, which is s = 9/10 ∗ 9/10 ∗ 1/10+1/10 ∗ 1/10 ∗ 9/10 = 90/1000.
It is easy to see that the same probability holds for the other cryptographers. Fig. 6
illustrates the situation. The observables o1, . . . , o3 are as before, o6 is 〈a, d, d〉.
Hence, in the biased case, Definition 3 is not satisfied. And this is what we expect,
because the system, intuitively, is not anonymous: when we observe 〈a, a, d〉, Crypt1
is much more likely to be the payer than any of the others.
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6.1 Independence from the probability distribution of the users
One important property of Definition 2 is that it is independent from the probability dis-
tribution of the users. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the condition of anonymity
simply means that the cones for o rooted in the nodes that result from the (probabilistic
and/or nondeterministic) selection of the culprit, have the same probabilistic measure,
and this measure is independent from the probability of the culprit.
We consider this property fundamental for a good notion of anonymity: An anonymity
protocol, in fact, should guarantee anonymity independently from (the attitude of) the
users who use it, as long as they follow the protocol.
Theorem 1. If (M, I, a,O, Z, p) is anonymous then for any p′ which differs from p
only on the a(i)’s, (M, I, a,O, Z, p′) is anonymous.
Proof. Assume that (M, I, a,O, Z, p) is anonymous. Consider a scheduler ς ∈ Z . It is
sufficient to show that for every o ∈ O and every i ∈ I , pς(o|a(i)) = p′ς(o|a(i)), or
equivalently
pς(o ∩ a(i))
pς(a(i))
=
p′ς(o ∩ a(i))
p′ς(a(i))
Assume that the choice of the a(j)′s is the first choice in etree(M, ς). If this is not the
case, then we can transform the tree into one which satisfy this assumption, and in which
the probability of events is the same. Fig. 7 shows the basic step of this transformation,
in the case c is an anonymous action. In case c is an observable actions, then in the
second tree c and the rightmost b must be switched in order to preserve the order in the
trace (in case such order is observable). Let Ξ be the set of runs whose visible traces
are of the form a(i).b1.b2. . . . .bk for b1.b2. . . . .bk ∈ o. We have that pς(o ∩ a(i)) =
pς(Ξ). Observe now that pς(Ξ) = pς(a(i))pς (Ξ ′), where Ξ ′ is the set of suffixes
of the runs that start at the node resulting from the choice of a(i). Hence we have
pς(o ∩ a(i)) = pς(a(i))pς(Ξ ′). Analogously, p′ς(o ∩ a(i)) = p′ς(a(i))p′ς(Ξ ′). But,
because of the hypothesis that pς and p′ς only differ on the a(i)′s, we have pς(Ξ ′) =
p′ς(Ξ
′), which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
6.2 Alternative characterization
We give here an alternative characterization of the notion of anonymity. The idea is that
a system is anonymous if the probability, under a certain scheduler, of an observable o,
given a(i), is the same as the probability of o given a under every other scheduler.
Proposition 2. A system (M, I, a,O,Z , p) is anonymous iff
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (pς(a(i)) > 0 ∧ pϑ(a) > 0)⇒ pς(o | a(i)) = pϑ(o | a)
Proof. If part) Let ς, ϑ ∈ Z and i, j ∈ I such that pς(a(i)) > 0 and pϑ(a(j)) > 0.
Since pϑ(a(j)) > 0 implies pϑ(a) > 0, by the hypothesis we have pς(o | a(i)) =
pϑ(o | a). Furthermore, by replacing in the hypothesis ς with ϑ and i with j we have
pϑ(o | a(j)) = pϑ(o | a).
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Fig. 7. Basic transformation step for the proof of Theorem 1.
Only if part) Let ς, ϑ ∈ Z and i ∈ I such that pς(a(i)) > 0 and pϑ(a) > 0.
pϑ(o ∩ a) = pϑ(o ∩
⋃
j∈I a(j))
= pϑ(
⋃
j∈I(o ∩ a(j)))
=
∑
j∈I pϑ(o ∩ a(j)) (by Assumption 1)
=
∑
pϑ(a(j))>0
pϑ(o ∩ a(j))
=
∑
pϑ(a(j))>0
pϑ(o | a(j)) pϑ(a(j))
= pς(o | a(i))
∑
pϑ(a(j))>0
pϑ(a(j)) (by Definition 2)
= pς(o | a(i)) pϑ(a)
Hence pϑ(o | a) = pϑ(o ∩ a)/pϑ(a) = pς(o | a(i)). ⊓⊔
7 Probabilistic Anonymity for nondeterministic users
The case in which the users are purely nondeterministic is characterized by the fact that
each scheduler determines completely whether an action of the form a(i) takes place or
not. Formally:
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. pς(a(i)) = 0 ∨ pς(a(i)) = 1 (3)
In the case of nondeterministic users, the definition of anonymity simplifies as fol-
lows:
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Proposition 3. A system (M, I, a,O,Z , p) in which the choice of a(i) (for i ∈ I) is
nondeterministic in each run, is anonymous if
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. pς(a) = pϑ(a) = 1 ⇒ pς(o) = pϑ(o)
Proof. Immediate by instantiating Definition 2 to the case in which (3) holds, and by
observing that, if pς(a(i)) = 1, then pς(o | a(i)) = pς(o). ⊓⊔
8 Probabilistic Anonymity for fully probabilistic systems
In this section we investigate how the removal of the nondeterminism influences our
definition of anonymity. We consider therefore purely probabilistic systems. This will
allow us also to compare our notion with other probabilistic proposals in literature.
Since the system is totally probabilistic, the probability measures do not depend
on the choice of the scheduler. To be more precise, there is only one scheduler. So we
can eliminate the component Z from the tuple and we can write p(x) instead of pς(x).
The definition of probabilistic anonymity given in previous section (cfr. Definition 2)
simplifies into the following:
Definition 3. A fully probabilistic system (M, I, a,O, p) is anonymous if
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0)⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j))
Furthermore, the alternative characterization in Proposition 2 reduces to the follow-
ing:
Proposition 4. A fully probabilistic system (M, I, a,O, p) is anonymous iff
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(a(i)) > 0⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a)
In the fully probabilistic case there are two other notions of anonymity that seem
rather natural. The first is based on the intuition that a system is anonymous if the
observations do not change the probability of a(i). The probability of a(i) before the
observation is called a priori probability; the probability of a(i) after the observation
is called a posteriori probability. So the intuition is that a protocol does not leak infor-
mation if these probabilities coincide. This is already known in literature as conditional
anonymity (cfr. [16]). It is interesting to point out the link with Information Theory:
the condition means, indeed, that the entropy of the random variable associated to the
culprit remains the same after the observation; i.e. the observation does not increase the
information about the culprit.
The second notion is based on the (similar) idea that observing o rather than o′
should not change our knowledge of the probability of a(i).
It is possible to prove that these two notions are equivalent. Furthermore, if we
assume that the action a (i.e. the existence of a culprit) is totally visible to the observer,
then we can prove that these notions are equivalent to ours. The condition “a is totally
visible” means that every observable o indicates unambiguously whether a has taken
place or not, i.e. it either implies a, or it implies ¬a. In other words this means that
either o (as a set) is contained in a (as a set) or in the complement of a. Formally:
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Assumption 2 (The existence of a culprit is observable)
∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) = p(o) ∨ p(o ∩ ¬a) = p(o)
We prove now our claims of equivalence.
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 2, the following conditions are equivalent to each
other and to our condition of anonymity.
(i) ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a)
(ii) ∀i ∈ I. ∀o, o′ ∈ O. (p(o ∩ a) > 0 ∧ p(o′ ∩ a) > 0) ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | o′).
Proof. We first show the equivalence of (i) and our condition of anonymity, using
Proposition 4.
Assume (i) and p(a(i)) > 0. If p(o ∩ a) = 0 then p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a) = 0.
Otherwise,
p(o | a(i)) =
p(a(i) | o) p(o)
p(a(i))
=
p(a(i)) p(o)
p(a) p(a(i))
(by (i))
=
p(o)
p(a)
=
p(o ∩ a)
p(a)
(by Assumption 2))
= p(o | a)
Viceversa, assume that the condition in Proposition 4 holds, and p(o ∩ a) > 0. If
p(a(i)) = 0, then p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a) = 0. Otherwise we derive p(a(i) | o) =
p(a(i))/p(a) from p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a), essentially reverting the above derivation.
As for the equivalence of (i) and (ii), we have:
(i) ⇒ (ii)) Let i ∈ I , and o, o′ ∈ O such that p(o ∩ a) > 0 and p(o′ ∩ a) > 0. By (i)
we have p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a) = p(a(i) | o′).
(ii) ⇒ (i)) Let i ∈ I and o ∈ O such that p(o ∩ a) > 0. We have
p(a(i)) = p(a(i) ∩
⋃
o′∈O o
′) (by (2))
= p(
⋃
o′∈O(a(i) ∩ o
′))
=
∑
o′∈O p(a(i) ∩ o
′) (by (1))
=
∑
p(o′∩a)>0 p(a(i) ∩ o
′)
=
∑
p(o′∩a)>0 p(a(i) | o
′) p(o′)
= p(a(i) | o)
∑
p(o′∩a)>0 p(o
′) (by (ii))
= p(a(i) | o) p(a) (by (2) and Assumption 2)
⊓⊔
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Proposition 5 is based on general properties of probabilistic spaces, independently
from the particular setting (in our case, probabilistic automata) which we use to define
the probabilities. Similar results have been presented in [15] and in [14] (for the case in
which a always occurs, i.e. p(a) = 1).
Since the notion of conditional anonymity (as well as the other notion in Propo-
sition 5) is equivalent to ours, we have that also these notions are independent from
the probability of the users. On the other hand, one has to keep in mind that the corre-
spondence only holds under the Assumptions 1 (only one culprit) and 2 (the existence
of a culprit is observable). Without Assumption 2 conditional anonymity is not inde-
pendent from the probabilities of the users. Without Assumption 1 neither conditional
anonymity nor our notion are independent.
Example 5. Fig. 8 shows an example in which Assumption 2 does not hold, and condi-
tional anonymity depends on the probability of the users. In fact the first tree satisfies
conditional anonymity, while the second does not. (They both satisfy our notion of
anonymity.)
Example 6. Fig. 9 shows an example in which Assumption 1 does not hold, and both
conditional anonymity and our notion of anonymity depend on the probability of the
users. In fact the first tree satisfies both kinds of anonymity, while the second does not.
9 Conditional anonymity and nondeterminism
It is not clear whether conditional anonymity [16] can be generalized to the case of the
users with nondeterministic behavior. The “naive” extensions obtained by introducing
the scheduler in the formulae would not work. Let us consider the first characterization,
i.e. conditional anonymity (for the other we would follow an analogous reasoning):
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a)
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Fig. 9. Illustration of Example 6.
One possible way of reintroducing the notion of scheduler is
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O.
(pς(o ∩ a) > 0 ∧ pϑ(a) > 0)⇒ pς(a(i) | o) = pϑ(a(i))/pϑ(a)
However this condition is too strong because it implies that pϑ(a(i))/pϑ(a) is the same
for every ϑ, and this is clearly not the case for instance for the nondeterministic and
probabilistic master specified in Section 2.
On the other hand, if we weaken the condition by identifying ς and ϑ:
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. pς(o ∩ a) > 0⇒ pς(a(i) | o) = pς(a(i))/pς(a)
then the condition would be too weak to ensure anonymity, as shown by the following
example:
Example 7. Consider a system in which the master influences the behavior of the coins
somehow, in such a way that when Crypti is chosen as the payer (say, purely nondeter-
ministically, by ςi) the result is always o0 = 〈d, a, a〉 for i = 0, o1 = 〈a, d, a〉 for i = 1,
and o2 = 〈a, a, d〉 for i = 2. Then we would have pςi(oj ∩ a) > 0 only if j = i, and
pςi(a(i) | oi) = 1 = pςi(a(i))/pςi(a). Hence the above condition would be satisfied,
but the system is not be anonymous at all: whenever we observe 〈d, a, a〉, for instance,
we are sure that Crypt0 is the payer.
10 Toward an automatic probabilistic checker
We have formulated the notion of anonymity in terms of observables for processes in
the probabilistic π-calculus, whose semantics is based on the probabilistic automata of
[34]. This opens the way to the automatic verification of the property.
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It is worth noting that existing probabilistic model checkers, like PRISM, cannot be
used directly to prove anonymity. In fact, PRISM computes only the infimum and the
supremum of the probabilities of a given formula with respect to all possible schedulers.
The anonymity property, on the contrary, requires computing the exact probability for
each scheduler.
We are currently developing a model checker using the probabilistic π-calculus. In
order to achieve this goal, several practical issues have to be fixed.
An automatic checker for our probabilistic notion of anonymity needs a full eval-
uation of the execution. This differs from the model checkers, where the process is
checked against a single property. In our case, we want to collect all the various out-
comes of the protocol and relate them to the inputs.
The natural language for an implementation is the asynchronous version of the π-
calculus. In the asynchronous variant of the π-calculus, only internal (blind) choice
is allowed and message sending is limited. The sending construct of the synchronous
language, xy.P is replaced by an atomic sending process xy. In [4], this limitation is
shown to be equivalent to using an unordered buffered communication medium.
A process in the asynchronous π-calculus cannot natively send a message and wait
until it is received to continue its execution. Encodings exist that mostly consist in an
acknowledgment of the reception, much like for the TCP protocol.
For a majority of applications, the asynchronous π-calculus is the natural language
for expressing a protocol or an algorithm, since most real-life communications and
modern electronic networks use asynchronous communication mediums. For instance,
the implementation of the the dining cryptographers proposed in this paper is purely
asynchronous. However, asynchronous communications imply algorithmic limitations,
such as for implementing a distributed consensus, as studied in [26].
A naive evaluation of the probabilistic executions can be very inefficient. When
communicating asynchronously, most communications happen without a particular or-
der. This generates interleavings, where several sequence of actions can be observed
in any order, but the overall result is the same. When evaluating this kind of execu-
tions, it is much more efficient to constrain the evaluation to only one of these possible
interleavings. This leads to the definition of restricted executions that we call focused.
Such focused evaluations have been proved to maintain all relevant informations on
the evaluated process. The may testing semantics is equivalent on focused and original
executions. Furthermore, two bisimilar processes for the focused executions are bisim-
ilar for the original executions. The implementation of such focused evaluator for the
asynchronous π-calculus is currently under development.
11 Related work
The work [19] presents a modular framework to formalize a range of properties (in-
cluding numerous flavors anonymity and privacy) of computer systems in which an
observer has only partial information about system behavior, thereby combining the
benefits of the knowledge-based approach (natural specification of information-hiding)
and the algebra-based approach (natural specification of system behavior). It proposes
the notion of function view to represent a mathematical abstraction of partial knowledge
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of a function. The logical formulae describing a property are characterized as opaque-
ness of certain function views, converted into predicates over observational equivalence
classes, and verified, when possible, using the proof techniques of the chosen process
formalism.
In [16, 37] epistemic logic is used to characterize a number of information-hiding
requirements (including anonymity). In particular, [37] introduces the notion of a group
principal and an associated model, language and logic to axiomatize anonymity. The
main advantage of modal logic is that even fairly complex properties can be stated
directly as formulae in the logic. On the other hand, [16] uses a completely seman-
tic approach and provides an appropriate semantic framework in which to consider
anonymity. It also propose notions of probabilistic anonymity in a purely probabilistic
framework. In particular, it propose a notion of conditional probability (cfr. Definition
4.4 in [16]) which is similar to the first characterization in Proposition 5, if we interpret
the formula ϕ in [16] as the occurrence of the event a. Another notion defined in [16] is
that of (strong) Probabilistic Anonymity, which is expressed as the requirement that the
a posteriory probabilities of two different anonymous events are the same under every
observable, i.e.
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(j) | o)
This condition seems quite natural at a first sight; however a more careful analysis
reveals that it is too strong. In [4] it was indeed proved (see also Appendix A.3) that it is
equivalent to our notion of anonymity (for fully probabilistic users) plus the condition
that the a priori probabilities of two anonymous events are the same, namely:
∀i, j ∈ I. p(a(i)) = p(a(j))
So Probabilistic Anonymity in the sense of [16] requires a uniform distribution on the
anonymous events, which, in our opinion, is too much of a restriction for the users.
The first characterization in Proposition 5 was also implicitly used by Chaum in
[11] (in which he considered a purely probabilistic system) as definition of anonymity.
The factor p(a) is not present in the formula of Chaum, but that may be a typo, because
in the informal explanation he gives, that factor is taken into account.
In literature there have been other works involving the use of variants of the π-
calculus for formalizing protocols providing anonymity or similar properties. See for
example [1, 20].
The research on the probabilistic foundations of anonymity (and more in general,
information-hiding, and the related field of information flow) has recently evolved to-
wards the use of Information Theory [13, 35, 22, 9, 23] and Hypothesis Testing [10, 36].
The advantage in the use of these frameworks is that they allow to define quantitative
degrees of anonymity. On the other hand, these framework are purely probabilistic, i.e.
assume that the behavior of the user is probabilistic, and do not consider the existence
of internal nondeterminism in the protocol.
With respect to the protocol’s nondeterminism, our definition of anonymity is quite
strict, because it requires that there is no leakage of information under any scheduler.
But in the majority of cases, we can define a scheduler that follows a different policy
depending on the choice of the anonymous event, thus leaking the information about
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the anonymous event. In the case of our example of the Dining Cryptographers we do
not have such problem, but we would have it if the declarations of the cryptographers
were observed as a sequence instead of a tuple. In fact, the scheduler could for instance
always schedule the declaration of the payer at last, thus revealing entirely who the
payer is. The problem of the scheduler in security, and a proposal for its solution, are
discussed in [8] and [7].
12 Conclusion and future work
We have proposed a notion of anonymity based on a model which combines probabil-
ity and nondeterminism, and we have shown that under certain assumptions it can be
regarded as a generalization of conditional anonymity [16].
We have formulated the notion of anonymity in terms of observables for processes in
the probabilistic π-calculus, whose semantics is based on the probabilistic automata of
[34]. This opens the way to the automatic verification of the property. We are currently
developing a model checker for the probabilistic π-calculus.
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A Appendix
A.1 The pi-calculus
We recall here the basic notions about the π-calculus. We choose the variant used in
[6, 31], which differs from the standard one because is has a guarded choice instead of
the free choice. This is convenient because it will allow to introduce the probabilistic
π-calculus, in the next section, in a smoother way.
Let N be a countable set of names, x, y, . . .. The set of prefixes, α, β, . . ., and the
set of π-calculus processes, P,Q, . . ., are defined by the following abstract syntax:
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Prefixes α ::= x(y) | x¯y | τ
Processes P ::=
∑
i αi.Pi | νxP | P |P
| !P | [x = y]P | [x 6= y]P
Prefixes represent the basic actions of processes: x(y) is the input of the (formal)
name y from channel x; x¯y is the output of the name y on channel x; τ stands for any
silent (non-communication) action.
The process
∑
i αi.Pi represents guarded (global) choice and it is usually assumed
to be finite. We will use the abbreviations 0 (inaction) to represent the empty sum,
α.P (prefix) to represent sum on one element only, and P + Q for the binary sum.
The symbols νx, |, and ! are the restriction, the parallel, and the replication operator,
respectively.
To indicate the structure of a process expression we will use the following conven-
tions:P0 |P1 |P2 | . . . |Pk−1 stands for (. . . ((P0 |P1) |P2) | . . . |Pk−1), i.e. the parallel
operator is left associative, and α1.P1 |α2.P2 stands for (α1.P1)|(α2.P2), i.e. the prefix
operator has precedence over |. In all other cases of ambiguity we will use parentheses.
The operators νx and y(x) are x-binders, i.e. in the processes νxP and y(x).P the
occurrences of x in P are considered bound, with the usual rules of scoping. The set of
the free names of P , i.e. those names which do not occur in the scope of any binder, is
denoted by fn(P ). The alpha-conversion of bound names is defined as usual, and the
renaming (or substitution) P{y/x} is defined as the result of replacing all occurrences
of x in P by y, possibly applying alpha-conversion to avoid capture.
In the paper we use also the construct
if x = y then P else Q
This expression is syntactic sugar standing for the process [x = y]P | [x 6= y]Q.
The operational semantics is specified via a transition system labeled by actions
µ, µ′ . . .. These are given by the following grammar:
Actions µ ::= xy | x¯y | x¯(y) | τ
Action xy corresponds to the input prefix x(z), where the formal parameter z is in-
stantiated to the actual parameter y (see Rule I-SUM in Table 1). Action x¯y corre-
spond to the output of a free name. The bound output x¯(y) is introduced to model
scope extrusion, i.e. the result of sending to another process a private (ν-bound) name.
The bound names of an action µ, bn(µ), are defined as follows: bn(x¯(y)) = {y};
bn(xy) = bn(x¯y) = bn(τ) = ∅. Furthermore, we will indicate by n(µ) all the names
which occur in µ.
In literature there are two definitions for the transition system of the π-calculus
which induce the so-called early and late bisimulation semantics respectively. Here we
choose to present the first one. There is no difference between the two for the purposes
of our paper.
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The rules for the early semantics are given in Table 1. The symbol ≡ used in Rule
CONG stands for structural congruence, a form of equivalence which identifies “stat-
ically” two processes. Again, there are several definition of this relation in literature.
For our purposes we do not need a very rich notion, we will just use it to simplify the
presentation. Hence we only assume this congruence to satisfy the following:
(i) P ≡ Q if Q can be obtained from P by alpha-renaming, notation P ≡α Q,
(ii) P |Q ≡ Q|P ,
(iii) (P |Q)|R ≡ P |(Q|R),
(iv) (νxP )|Q ≡ νx(P |Q) if x 6∈ fv(Q),
(v) !P ≡ P | !P ,
(vi) [x = x]P ≡ P ,
(vii) [x 6= y]P ≡ P , if x is syntactically different from y.
A.2 The probabilistic pi-calculus
In this section we recall the definition of the probabilistic π-calculus, πp, which was
introduced in [17]. This calculus was used in [27] to express various randomized al-
gorithms, notably the distributed implementation of the π-calculus with mixed choice.
In this paper, we are going to use it as a formalism to express systems of probabilistic
anonymous agents.
Probabilistic automata The πp-calculus is based on the model of probabilistic au-
tomata of Segala and Lynch [34], which are able to express both probabilistic and non-
deterministic behaviors.
A discrete probabilistic space is a pair (X, p) where X is a finite or countable set
and p is a function p : X → (0, 1] such that
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1. Given a set Y , we define
the sets of all probabilistic spaces on Y as
Prob(Y ) = {(X, p) | X ⊆ Y and (X, p) is
a discrete probabilistic space }.
Given a set of states S and a set of actions A, a probabilistic automaton on S and A
is a triple (S, T , s0) where s0 ∈ S (initial state) and T ⊆ S × Prob(A × S). We call
the elements of T transition groups (in [34] they are called steps). The idea behind this
model is that the choice between two different groups is made nondeterministically and
possibly controlled by an external agent, e.g. a scheduler, while the transition within the
same group is chosen probabilistically and it is controlled internally (e.g. by a proba-
bilistic choice operator). An automaton in which there is at most one transition group
for each state is called fully probabilistic.
We define now the notion of execution of an automaton under a scheduler, by adapt-
ing and simplifying the corresponding notion given in [34]. A scheduler can be seen as a
function that solves the nondeterminism of the automaton by selecting, at each moment
of the computation, a transition group among all the ones allowed in the present state.
Schedulers are sometimes called adversaries, thus conveying the idea of an external
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I-SUM
P
i
αi.Pi
x(z)
−→ Pj [z/y] αj = x(y)
O/τ -SUM
P
i
αi.Pi
αj
−→ Pj αj = x¯y or αj = τ
OPEN
P
x¯y
−→ P ′
νyP
x¯(y)
−→ P ′
x 6= y
RES
P
µ
−→ P ′
νyP
µ
−→ νyP ′
y 6∈ n(µ)
PAR
P
µ
−→ P ′
P |Q
µ
−→ P ′|Q
bn(µ) ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
COM
P
x(y)
−→ P ′ Q
x¯y
−→ Q′
P |Q
τ
−→ P ′|Q′
CLOSE
P
x(y)
−→ P ′ Q
x¯(y)
−→ Q′
P |Q
τ
−→ νy(P ′|Q′)
CONG
P ≡ P ′ P ′
µ
−→ Q′ Q′ ≡ Q
P
µ
−→ Q
Table 1. The transition system of the pi-calculus.
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entity playing “against” the process. For the purpose of this paper, however, we stick to
the term “scheduler” in order to avoid confusion with the notion of adversary used in
security. We will assume that a scheduler can decide the next transition group depend-
ing not only on the current state, but also on the whole history of the computation till
that moment, including the random choices made by the automaton.
Given a probabilistic automaton M = (S, T , s0), define tree(M) as the tree ob-
tained by unfolding the transition system, i.e. the tree with a root n0 labeled by s0, and
such that, for each node n, if s ∈ S is the label of n, then for each (s, (X, p)) ∈ T ,
and for each (µ, s′) ∈ X , there is a node n′ child of n labeled by s′, and the arc from
n to n′ is labeled by µ and p(µ, s′). We will denote by nodes(M) the set of nodes in
tree(M), and by state(n) the state labeling a node n.
A scheduler for M is a function ς that associates to each node n of tree(M)
a transition group among those which are allowed in state(n). More formally, ς :
nodes(M)→ Prob(A× S) such that ς(n) = (X, p) implies (state(n), (X, p)) ∈ T .
The execution tree of an automaton M = (S, T , s0) under a scheduler ς , de-
noted by etree(M, ς), is the tree obtained from tree(M) by pruning all the arcs cor-
responding to transitions which are not in the group selected by ς . More formally,
etree(M, ς) is a fully probabilistic automaton (S′, T ′, n0), where S′ ⊆ nodes(M),
n0 is the root of tree(M), and (n, (X ′, p′)) ∈ T ′ iff X ′ = {(µ, n′) | (µ, state(n′)) ∈
X and n′ is a child of n in tree(M)} and p′(µ, n′) = p(µ, state(n′)), where (X, p) =
ς(n). If (n, (X ′, p′)) ∈ T ′, (µ, n′) ∈ X ′, and p′(µ, n′) = p, we will use sometime the
notation n µ−→
p
n′.
An execution fragment ξ is any path (finite or infinite) from the root of etree(M, ς).
The notation ξ ≤ ξ′ means that ξ is a prefix of ξ′. If ξ is n0
µ0
−→
p0
n1
µ1
−→
p1
n2
µ2
−→
p2
. . ., the
probability of ξ is defined as p(ξ) =
∏
i pi. If ξ is maximal, then it is called execution.
We denote by exec(M, ς) the set of all executions in etree(M, ς).
We define now a probability on certain sets of executions, following a standard
construction of Measure Theory. Given an execution fragment ξ, let Cξ = {ξ′ ∈
exec(M, ς) | ξ ≤ ξ′} (cone with prefix ξ). Define p(Cξ) = p(ξ). Let {Ci}i∈I be
a countable set of disjoint cones (i.e. I is countable, and ∀i, j. i 6= j ⇒ Ci ∩ Cj = ∅).
Then define p(
⋃
i∈I Ci) =
∑
i∈I p(Ci). Two countable sets of disjoint cones with the
same union produce the same result for p, so p is well defined. Further, we define the
probability of an empty set of executions as 0, and the probability of the complement
of a certain set of executions, with respect to the all executions as the complement
with respect to 1 of the probability of the set. The closure of the cones (plus the empty
set) under countable unions and complementation generates what in Measure Theory is
known as a σ-field.
Syntax and transition system of the pip-calculus We will now illustrate the πp-
calculus. Syntactically, the only difference with respect to the π-calculus is that we
do not have the free choice (or mixed guarded choice depending on the presentation),
and we have instead the output prefix
x¯y.P
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and the following probabilistic non-output choice operator
∑
i
piαi.Pi
where the pi’s represents positive probabilities, i.e. they satisfy pi ∈ (0, 1] and
∑
i pi =
1, and the αi’s are non-output prefixes, i.e. either input or silent prefixes.
Note that the nondeterministic blind choice τ.P + τ.Q can be obtained in this cal-
culus by using the parallel operator: it is in fact equivalent to (νx)(x¯ ‖ x.P ‖ x.Q).
In order to give the formal definition of the probabilistic model for πp, it is con-
venient to introduce the following notation: given a probabilistic automaton (S, T , s0)
and s ∈ S, we write
s {
µi
−→
pi
si | i ∈ I}
iff (s, ({(µi, si) | i ∈ I}, p)) ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I pi = p(µi, si), where I is an index set.
When I is not relevant, we will use the simpler notation s { µi−→
pi
si}i. We will also use
the notation s { µi−→
pi
si}i:φ(i), where φ(i) is a logical formula depending on i, for the set
s {
µi
−→
pi
si | i ∈ I and φ(i)}.
The operational semantics of a πp process P is a probabilistic automaton whose
states are the processes reachable from P and the T relation is defined by the rules in
Table 2.
The following is an informal explanation of the rules in Table 2.
SUM: This rule models the behavior of a choice process: each transition corresponds to
the possible execution of an enabled guard αi and the consequent commitment to
the branch Pi. Note that all possible transitions belong to the same group, meaning
that the transition is chosen probabilistically by the process itself.
OUT: This rule expresses the fact that an output prefix process α.P simply performs
the action, and then continues with P .
RES: This rule models restriction on channel y: only the actions on channels different
from y can be performed and possibly synchronize with an external process. The
probability is redistributed among these actions.
OPEN: This rule works in combination with CLOSE by signaling that the send action
labeling the transition is on a name which is private to the sender.
PAR: This rule represents the interleaving of parallel processes. All the transitions of
the processes involved are made possible, and they are kept separated in the orig-
inal groups. In this way we model the fact that the selection of the process for
the next computation step is determined by a scheduler. In fact, choosing a group
corresponds to choosing a process.
COM: This rule models communication by handshaking. The output action synchro-
nizes with all matching input actions of a partner, with the same probability of the
input action. The other possible transitions of the partner are kept with the original
probability as well. Note that the side condition ensure that all matching inputs are
considered. Thanks to alpha-conversion, we can always rewrite a process so that
this condition is met.
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SUM
P
i
piαi.Pi {
xi(zi)−→
pi
P ′i}i
αi = xi(yi) and P ′i = Pi[zi/yi] or
αi = τ and P ′i = Pi
OUT xy.P { xy−→
1
P}
OPEN
P {
xy
−→
1
P ′}
νyP {
x(y)
−→
1
P ′}
x 6= y
RES
P {
µi−→
pi
Pi}i
νyP {
µi−→
p′
i
νyPi}i:y 6∈fn(µi)
∃i. y 6∈ fn(µi) and
∀i. p′i = pi/
P
j:y 6∈fn(µj)
pj
PAR
P {
µi−→
pi
Pi}i
P | Q {
µi−→
pi
Pi | Q}i
bn(µ) ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
COM
P {
xy
−→
1
P ′} Q {
µi−→
pi
Qi}i
P | Q {
τ
−→
pi
P ′ | Qi}i:µi=x(y) ∪ {
µi−→
pi
P | Qi}i:µi 6=x(y)
if µi = x(z) then z = y
CLOSE
P {
x(y)
−→
1
P ′} Q {
µi−→
pi
Qi}i
P | Q {
τ
−→
pi
νy(P ′ | Qi)}i:µi=x(y) ∪ {
µi−→
pi
P | Qi}i:µi 6=x(y)
if µi = x(z) then z = y
CONG
P ≡ P ′ P ′ {
µi−→
pi
Q′i}i ∀i. Q
′
i ≡ Qi
P {
µi−→
pi
Qi}i
Table 2. The probabilistic transition system of the pip-calculus.
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CLOSE: This rule is analogous to COM, the only difference is that the name being
transmitted is private (local) to the sender.
CONG: This rule rule says that structurally equivalent processes perform the same tran-
sitions.
A.3 Relation between notions of anonymity for probabilistic users
In this appendix we prove the claim we made in Section 11 (and already proved in [4]),
namely that the notion of probabilistic anonymity of Halpern and O’Neil (cfr. Definition
4.4 in [16]), i.e.
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(j) | o) (4)
is equivalent to our notion of anonymity (for fully probabilistic users) plus the condition
that the a priori probabilities of two anonymous events are the same, that is:
∀i, j ∈ I. p(a(i)) = p(a(j)) (5)
In order to prove the above claim, let us recall our definition of anonymity as given
in Definition 3:
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0)⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j)) (6)
Proposition 6. (4)⇔ (5), (6)
Proof.
(4) ⇒ (5) )
p(a(i)) =
∑
o p(a(i) and o) by the disjointness of the anonymous actions
=
∑
o p(a(i)|o) p(o) by definition of conditional probability
=
∑
o p(a(j)|o) p(o) by (4)
=
∑
o p(a(j) and o)
= p(a(j))
(4) ⇒ (6) )
p(o|a(i)) =
p(a(i)|o) p(o)
p(a(i))
by Bayes theorem
=
p(a(j)|o) p(o)
p(a(i))
by (4)
=
p(a(j)|o) p(o)
p(a(j))
by (5)
= p(o|a(j)) by Bayes theorem
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(4) ⇐ (5) , (6))
p(a(i)|o) =
p(o|a(i)) p(a(i))
p(o)
by Bayes theorem
=
p(o|a(j)) p(a(i))
p(o)
by (6)
=
p(o|a(j)) p(a(j))
p(o)
by (5)
= p(a(j)|o) by Bayes theorem
⊓⊔
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